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GAMBLING AND THE LAW®:
THE THIRD WAVE OF LEGAL GAMBLING*
I. NELSON ROSE**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the author's 1986 book, GAMBLING AND THE LAW, the
proliferation of gambling was described as a third wave.' Twice
before in American history, legal gambling has spread across the
nation, only to crash down in scandal and complete prohibition. 2
In the 21st century, the description of the spread of legal gaming as
a "wave" appears too conservative. A tsunami seems like a more
appropriate description.
In 2008, Americans bought about $10 billion in tickets at the
nation's approximately 36,000 movie screens. 3 By comparison, in
the same year, forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and three
U.S. possessions operate lotteries4, which combined sold more than
$60.6 billion in lottery tickets. 5 And the comparison is appropriate.
* ©Copyright 2010 by Prof. I. Nelson Rose. All rights reserved worldwide.
Gambling and the Law® is a registered trademark of Prof. I. Nelson Rose,
www.GamblingAndTheLaw.com.
** J.D. Harvard Law School 1979, Distinguished Senior Professor of Law,
Whittier Law School, Costa Mesa, California; Visiting Professor, University of Ma-
cau. The author is recognized as a leading authority on gambling law and is a
consultant to governments and industry.
1. See I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAw 1 (1986) (describing current
proliferation of gambling as third wave since colonial times).
2. See id. First wave refers to public and private lotteries held during colonial
times to finance public operations without national government; second wave re-
fers to public lotteries established in South following Civil War as means for acquir-
ing funding needed to rebuild. See id.
3. See Movie Market Summary - 1995 to 2010, http://www.the-numbers.com/
market/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (detailing theater industry revenues).
4. See Official United States of America Lotteries Web Sites, http://www.fraud
aid.com/scamspam/lottery/US-lottery-websites.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010)
(listing US States running legitimate lotteries). These three territories are Puerto
Rico, Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. See North American Asso-
ciation of State and Provincial Lotteries, http://www.naspl.org/index.cfm?fuseac-
tion=content&PageID=3&PageCategory=3 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010)
(hereinafter, North American Lotteries) (listing US States and territories running
lotteries).
5. See North American Lotteries, supra note 4. Fiscal year 2008 lottery sales
for the U.S. states and District of Columbia were reported as $60.6 billion. See id.
(breaking down lottery sales for 2008). Despite losses in other areas of gaming
during 2008, two-thirds of lotteries reported an increase in profits. See Patricia
McQueen, Amid Difficult Times, U.S., Canadian Lotteries Are Holding Their Own, CA-
SINO JouRNAL, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://www.casinojournal.com/Articles/
(361)
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A potential customer can decide to spend about $7 for a little en-
tertainment by buying a movie ticket, or can buy seven $1 lottery
tickets. 6 The figures show that while Americans spent a record
$10.49 billion on 1.46 billion movie tickets in 2009, 7 they spent ap-
proximately six times as much, buying 40 times as many lottery
tickets.8
When the lottery ticket sales are added to all the additional
"action" in casinos and on slot machines - such as pari-mutuel bets
on horses, dogs, and jai-alai; legal wagers on sports; bets made in
licensed card rooms; and expenditures before prize payments in
charity gaming and Indian bingo - the total amount wagered le-
gally in the United States is well over a trillion dollars.9
The amount wagered, called the "handle," is inflated because it
includes all bets. Thus, if a player bets $25 and wins and then bets
$25 and loses, a total of $50 has been wagered, even though no
money has changed hands. A more accurate number for making
comparisons with other industries is the gross revenue or "win," i.e.
the amount players lose. Since this is money left behind by custom-
ers after the gambling transaction, it corresponds nicely with gross
revenue or sales from other retail businesses. Looking just at reve-
nue, Americans spent more money on gambling, $92.3 billion, than
they did on all live events - i.e. concerts, plays, all movie theaters,
all spectator sports, and all forms of recorded music - combined.10
It may say something about us as a nation, or it may just be that
Baby Boomers' children are growing up. Either way, in 1994, for
Cover_Story/BNPGUID_9-5-2006 A_10000000000000452519 (noting overall
growth in lottery revenue despite downturns in other parts of gaming market).
6. See Ticket Statistics, National Association of Theater Owners, http://
www.na toonline.org/statisticstickets.htm (listing national average ticket prices be-
tween 1949 and 2009).
7. See Movie Market, supra note 3 (detailing US movie ticket revenues for
2009).
8. See North American Lotteries, supra note 4 (detailing US lottery revenues).
The numbers are only approximate for state lotteries, since some tickets do cost
more than $1 each, and a few states have Video Lottery Terminals ("VLTs"), which
operate like slot machines and do not dispense paper tickets. See e.g., Oregon
Lottery, http://www.oregonlottery.org/video/info.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2010) (naming games and providing links to History and Myths & Facts about
VLTs).
9. It was estimated to be $638.6 billion in 1997, when the gaming industry was
much smaller. See Eugene Martin Christiansen, The United States Gross Annual Wa-
ger: 1997, INTERNATIONAL GAMING & WAGERING BUSINESS, Aug. 1998, at 3 (examin-
ing US gambling revenue in 1997).
10. See Eugene Martin Christiansen, Consumer Spending on U.S. Gaming Sur-
passed $90 Billion in 2006, INTERNATIONAL GAMING & WAGERING BUSINESS, Nov. 1,
2007, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/I1l-170280791.html (discuss-
ing consumer spending on gaming in 2006).
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the first time, adults in America spent more money on gambling
than they did on toys for their children."
It is not just the money, but rather the general availability of
gambling venues that is the real story. At least twelve states have
commercially owned riverboat, dockside or land-based casinos and
another five have card clubs. Tribal Class II gaming, primarily
bingo, poker and other non-banking card games, and Class III casi-
nos are open and operating in 29 states. "Racinos," usually indistin-
guishable from traditional casinos, are in twelve states. 12 There is
legal gambling in the territories and possessions of the United
States, including major casinos in Puerto Rico and the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Every state except Utah
and Hawaii has some form of commercial gambling, and Hawaii is
currently considering allowing casinos to help native Hawaiians. 1'
Imagine telling someone from 1909, when there was virtually
universal prohibition on legal gambling in this country, or even a
visitor from the America of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, that
there is a state in the United States that has the following forms of
legal gaming:
- Casinos,
- A state lottery,
- Charity bingo,
- Video poker machines in nearly every bar,
- Racetracks and pari-mutuel betting on dog racing,
- Racetracks and pari-mutuel betting on horse racing,
- Internet betting within the state and across state lines on
racing,
- And the State itself takes bets on sports events.
Then, tell him or her that this state is not Nevada, but Oregon.
11. See Eugene Martin Christiansen & William E. Cummings, The United States
Gross Annual Wager, INTERNATIONAL GAMING & WAGERING BUSINESS, Aug. 1, 1995, at
29 (analyzing gambling revenues and toy revenues). Total sales of durable toys &
goods were $39.0 billion compared to the $39.9 billion in gross revenue for gam-
bling. See id. (examining ratio of durable goods revenues to gambling revenues).
12. See State of the States: The AGA Survey of Casino Entertainment, Ameri-
can Gaming Association, http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/uploads/
agasos2009webFINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (surveying and summarizing
American casino statistics for 2009). "Racino" is a term meaning a casino with a
racetrack. See id. (defining racino).
13. See Katherine Nichols, Gambling Bill Designed to Lift Native Hawaiians, HON-
OLULU STAR BULLETIN, Feb. 6, 2010, available at http://www.starbulletin.com/
news/20100204 Gambling-bill-designedto-liftnativeHawaiians.html (explor-
ing Hawaii's consideration of casino legalization).
2010]
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Legal gambling has become such an accepted part of Ameri-
can life that it is often not even noticed, even when its impact is
extraordinary. The May 20, 1996 issue of Forbes magazine featured
a cover story on "Getting rich outside corporate America." The edi-
tors did not feel it newsworthy to point out that two of the four
individuals pictured on the cover made their money from gam-
bling: A professional poker player and the chairman of a tribe with
a casino.
The most dramatic reversal of the law's traditional antipathy
toward gambling may have been as early as 1986, when, in Commis-
sioner v. Groetzinger, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a full-time
gambler could declare himself to be in the trade or business of
gambling for tax purposes. 14
Even Indian gaming has become so commonplace and respect-
able that it has passed the ultimate test: gaining access to legitimate
financing. The Mohegan Sun was the first tribal casino to receive
financing from Wall Street, placing $175 million in high-yield
bonds with institutional investors. The Mashantucket Pequots rat-
tled the bond markets in 2009 when they announced that they
could not make payments on billions of dollars in loans, bringing
into question whether gaming tribes are legally obligated to pay
back anything (and even if they are, whether there any remedies
available to lenders).
The proliferation of legal gambling is shaped by such factors as
historical legal baggage, feelings of morality and tradition,
demographics, social and psychological factors, and pure irrational-
ity. Gambling spreads in a haphazard manner, with long-term re-
curring patterns played out against a background of local politics
and unpredictable technology.
Except for compulsive gamblers, this proliferation looks like an
unmixed blessing. With only a little effort, bettors can find any type
of game or bet they want, and since these wagers are legal and usu-
ally heavily regulated, they know that the game is honest. They will
be paid if they win and they will not be robbed on the way to the car
or arrested for simply making a bet. But, we really do not know
where players are getting the money to wager on the new forms of
gambling. A small but significant portion is money that would have
otherwise been spent on long-established operations, like race-
tracks. Most people appear to not treat gambling money as merely
part of their entertainment budget. The amount spent on movies
14. See 480 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1986) (holding that gambling can be considered
profession for purposes of achieving tax write-offs).
[Vol. 17: p. 361
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and beer is about the same as it was before the current gambling
boom. So where is the money coming from? A large state lottery,
for example, sells more than $4 billion in tickets each year, and
keeps half. Two billion dollars is spent on useful items such as
teachers' salaries; but, it had to come from somewhere. Perhaps
part of the answer is that, with locally owned and operated gaming
creating local jobs, and especially if winners are also locals, the two
billion dollars never left the state.
For legal gambling operations, the explosive spread of gaming
jurisdictions is definitely a mixed blessing. New games introduce
new players to gambling, but competition for the gambling dollar is
fierce. The more available betting opportunities are, the more peo-
ple will wager. However, players can only lose their gambling dollar
once.
These factors raise the significant question on how the spread
of gambling will impact future generations. In attempting formu-
late an answer, it is important to remember that the prior two gam-
bling waves ended with nationwide prohibitions on virtually all
forms of gaming. Is the current boom headed toward the same
bust?
II. CYCLES OF LEGALIZATION
Like a prophecy fulfilled, it looks like we are doomed to repeat
our history, having failed to learn the lessons of the past. Twice
before in American history, players could make legal bets in almost
every state, but these waves of legal gambling came crashing down
in scandal, ruin, and ultimately prohibition.
Americans are not sure of what role law should have in society.
Should the law be used only against acts that everyone agrees
should be illegal, like murder? Or, should law be used as a tool to
enforce morality, like Prohibition? This distinction is most troub-
ling with the morally suspect industries - alcohol, drugs, abortion
and gambling. Although the Prohibition Era is the best example,
there have always been limits and prohibitions in American law that
large numbers of the population violated on a fairly regular basis,
often without even knowing they have broken the law.
The anti-gambling prohibitions epitomize the traditional ap-
proach taken by American laws. These laws are not only designed
to protect people from themselves, but are part of a greater moral
framework designed by policy-makers to create an imagined ideal
society. Surveys and election results have shown that voters want
most of the anti-gambling laws to stay on the books, even if they do
2010]
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not want those laws to be actively enforced (unless they are used
against a noisy neighbor) . 1 5
Perhaps our cycles of complete prohibition to complete per-
missiveness and back again can be explained by the tendency of
Americans to go to the limits, and beyond. Congress passed the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act with the image of tribal bingo halls
in mind. Entrepreneurs took the poorly written law and used it to
create some of the largest casinos in the world. Similarly, legislators
in Missouri and Mississippi thought they were legalizing pictur-
esque riverboats. Operators brought in 40,000-square-foot barges
and built dockside casinos and boats-in-a-moat that are indistin-
guishable from non-floating casinos.
Sometimes it is unfortunate that our memories are so short.
We believe that what we see about us has always existed and will
continue unchanged indefinitely. Of course, there are natural re-
strictions. Even the best memory cannot stretch beyond a human
lifetime. Historical writings allow us to reach backwards in time,
but we lose the emotional feel associated with those past writings.
Gambling has had a recurring, consistent pattern throughout
the country's history. When gambling is illegal, there is pressure
for legalization, first of one game and then, gradually, of all forms.
Although it may be illegal, many people are gambling at social
games, underground commercial lotteries, race books or casinos.
The laws are difficult to enforce and the general population does
not want arrests made if it means taking police resources away from
more serious crimes. The result is widespread evasion of the law,
leading to disrespect, bribery, and corruption. The response by the
public is a demand for reform; for something to be done to prevent
involvement by officials in these areas of moral ambiguity. The per-
ceived solution is often a demand for legalization - if it is not a
crime, there would be no reason to bribe law enforcement or pub-
lic officials.
Sometimes the breakthrough comes from the legalization of a
seemingly benign form, such as charity bingo. Once one form of
gambling has been legalized, the anti-gambling arguments based
on morality begin to fade away. Legalization of gambling seems to
correspond with a general trend toward permissiveness in society.
The Victorian morality that says nothing is permitted is replaced by
15. See T.W. Mangione, et al., Citizen Views of Gambling Enforcement, GAMBLING
IN AMERICA, Appendix 1, 240-300 (1976) (identifying that most Americans prefer
gambling laws).
[Vol. 17: p. 361
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the belief that everything is permitted, so long as you do not hurt another
person. And gambling is the least harmful of the victimless crimes.
People see hypocrisy in the remaining prohibitions. Mark Cur-
riden notes that, "U]urors in Atlanta in the mid-1990s started ac-
quitting sports bookmaking defendants on a regular basis, even
though such cases were usually slam dunks. In post-trial interviews,
jurors said they saw no moral difference between sports betting and
playing the Georgia lottery."' 6 Even the legalization of a game by a
neighboring state can start the decline of the moral barriers against
gambling. It is difficult for a state official to argue that a lottery
would be immoral when his constituents are going across the state
line by the millions to purchase tickets.
Proponents can direct discussion toward cost/benefit analyses
of various other games that might be legalized. Once all of the
states in a region have the same game, the first to legalize a new
game has an advantage and can siphon off the disposable income
of its neighbors. A domino effect is created.
Meanwhile, the police and prosecutors are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to enforce those anti-gambling laws that are still on
the books, and venality is growing. Even the police begin to see
hypocrisy in trying to prohibit a wager when an almost identical
game is being actively promoted by the state.
Most of the states are presently at this point in the cycle. The
wave of legalized gambling is still rising throughout the nation, al-
though some forms, like state lotteries, have already captured virtu-
ally every state. In the past, the wave continued to grow until many
forms of gambling became legal, widespread and commercialized.
In the past, everyone seemed to be playing and the amounts of
money involved were staggering. Those few prohibitions that still
existed were virtually ignored by the police, and venality and cor-
ruption became widespread and open.
Historically, the next stage has been a devastating deluge of
public scandals. Legal gambling is very big business with very few
paper records; of the $90 billion that is bet each year, most is in the
form of untraceable cash. It is not difficult to understand the temp-
tation to try and go beyond what is allowed, both by inventing new,
faster forms of gambling or even rigging the outcome of a legal
game.
But cheating can be fatal to the industry. In the past, the com-
bination of highly publicized scandals and a reawakened morality
16. Mark Curriden, Power of 12, ABAJouRNAL, Aug. 2001, at 39.
2010] 367
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closed down the games. Constitutional amendments were passed
with the intent of outlawing gambling forever. Of course, constitu-
tions can be re-amended. Prohibition only leads, inevitably, to the
next stage where demand once again builds for the legalization of
some forms of gambling.
III. HISTORY AND HISTORIcAL BAGGAGE FROM THE FIrST WAVE
America's first wave of legal gambling began even before there
was a country. The earliest settlements were funded, in part, by
lotteries in England. 17 The first race track was set up in New York
in 1666.18 Gaming was usually outlawed by statute; the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony banned the possession of cards, dice, or gaming
tables, even in private homes. 19 But the colonies were awash in lot-
teries, licensed by both states and the newly formed federal govern-
ment.20 In part this was because, during the colonial period and
even after the American Revolution, America lacked a fiscal infra-
structure. There simply were too few banks and other large finan-
cial institutions to provide capital for building roads, or even
mortgages for homes. Running a lottery, which more closely resem-
bled a raffle, might be the only way for an individual to sell a house.
It appears to have been easier to buy a lottery ticket during George
Washington's time than the present.
Technological and social developments radically changed the
nation's attitude toward gambling between the colonial period and
the Civil War. The invention of the steamboat led to the establish-
ment of riverboat commerce. The Golden Age of the almost always
dishonest riverboat gamblers ended with Civil War blockades and
the invention of the railroad. 21
Lotteries were everywhere, including older, larger cities. Pri-
vate individuals ran early American lotteries with no government
17. See John Samuel Ezell, FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL: THE LOTTERY IN
AMERICA 30-32, 177, 204-405 (Harvard University Press 1960) (exploring history of
American gambling).
18. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINALJUSTICE, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776-1976 41 (U.S. Govt. Print 1977)
[hereinafter The Development of the Law of Gambling] (chronicling colonial pe-
riod gambling efforts).
19. See id. (reciting records of court assistants of Colony of Massachusetts Bay
regarding ban on gambling forms).
20. See Henry Chafetz, PLAY THE DEVIL: A HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM 1492 TO 1955 Section IV (Bonanza Books 1960) (detailing
prevalence of colonial lotteries).
21. SeeJohn Philip Jones, GAMBUNG YESTERDAY AND TODAY. A COMPLETE His-
TORY 23 (David & Charles PLC 1973) (exploring emergence of riverboat gambling
and dockside casinos).
[Vol. 17: p. 361
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oversight. A fee was paid to the state for a license, but no one ex-
cept the operators looked at the books. Licensed by the state, but
without any regulation or governmental controls, the lotteries were
hit by widespread scandals, the worst being that drawings were
often not held at all. Operators would stall for months and years,
claiming they had not sold enough tickets, and then disappear. A
gambler will put up with terrible odds, or even a rigged game, if it is
the only game in town. But no one tolerates the lottery con game
where there is no winner at all.
The 1820s and 1830s saw the birth of a reform movement. The
movement became centered on Andrew Jackson's call for a clean
sweep and to "throw the rascals out." Although Jackson himself was
a noted gambler, his movement to bring in the common man, and
to eliminate corruption, lent support to growing anti-lottery
feelings.
The mix of the two - lottery scandals and a newfound moral-
ity - led to the near-complete prohibition of lotteries. The feel-
ings of emotional revulsion were so strong that reformers
attempted to lock out lotteries, for what they thought was forever,
by writing bans into their state constitutions. As new states were
born, their constitutions also contained flat prohibitions on lotter-
ies. Settlers in frontier states like Nevada, Texas and California
brought strong anti-lottery feelings with them. Delegates to the
constitutional conventions creating these new states had personal
knowledge of lottery scandals back East.
In the state constitutions of the era, there is usually no men-
tion of other forms of gambling. Casino games might not have
been legal (the author has been unable to find a single statute per-
mitting riverboat gambling), but the public felt betting at games of
chance, where players had to go to a place to participate, was a
relatively easy problem that could be handled by the legislature.
The lottery, on the other hand, was viewed as particularly insidious.
By 1862 Missouri and Kentucky were the only states that had not
banned lotteries altogether.22
The most important pieces of legal debris from the fall of the
first wave of legal gambling are the state constitutional bans on lot-
teries. So much time has passed that sometimes the meaning of the
term "lottery" has been lost or warped to include other forms of
gambling, creating enormous problems for proponents of bingo,
pari-mutuel wagering and casinos.
22. See George Sullivan, By CHANCE A WINNER: THE HISTORY OF LOTTERIES 50-
51 (Dodd, Mead 1972) (considering ban of lotteries by Missouri and Kentucky).
2010]
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Amending a state constitution is difficult, requiring a vote of
the people. A century after the anti-lottery provisions were written
and long after the memory of the scandals that led to their creation
died away, proponents of state lotteries were able to win constitu-
tional elections in more than three dozen states.
Proponents of casinos have not fared as well. Voters have al-
most always rejected amending their state constitutions to bring in
high-stake casinos. However, many state legislatures have been able
to legalize casinos, where no vote was required. These include
some of the leading casino states, including Nevada, Mississippi,
and now Pennsylvania, where the constitutional ban on "lotteries"
has been interpreted as being limited to true lotteries, enabling
state legislatures to legalize casinos without a statewide vote.
The crash of the first wave also led to the enactment of the first
federal anti-lottery statutes. The federal laws were weak because in
the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s, it was widely believed that the federal
government did not have much power.
IV. HISTORY AND HISTORICAL BAGGAGE FROM THE SECOND WAVE
The second wave began with the Civil War and the continuing
expansion of the western frontier. The South turned to state-li-
censed lotteries as a painless way to raise revenue. 23 Legal gam-
bling is often seen as a painless, or voluntary, tax. Many southern
states resumed state-licensed lotteries. 24 State constitutional
prohibitions were ignored or rewritten by the governments im-
posed by the victorious North to allow state statutes to be rewritten
during the Reconstruction era to allow lotteries. Lotteries were
viewed as being for primarily good purposes, such as the founding
of the University of Mississippi.
Throughout the Wild West, gambling was ubiquitous. When
the frontier developed, it was common to see casino games being
played openly. Whether these games were technically legal was not
a major issue at the time. Licensed casinos dominated the heart of
San Francisco during the Gold Rush. Frequently, gaming houses
were explicitly made legal so that government could raise revenue
through licensing and avoid the problems epitomized by Prohibi-
tion, which created criminal statutes that no one obeyed. Though
23. See Ezell, supra note 17, at Ch. 12 (detailing ways to raise revenue during
second wave); see The Development of the Law of Gambling, supra note 18, at 282
(considering state-licensed lotteries as revenue vehicles).
24. See Ezell, supra note 17, at Ch. 12 (discussing start of second wave of gam-
bling in southern United States following Civil War).
[Vol. 17: p. 361
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the gaming houses were legal, the games often were not. However,
the illegal games were ignored by law enforcement because it was
difficult to outlaw this typical frontier diversion. 25
Based on memoirs of 19th century casino operators, it appears
that nearly all casino games were crooked. In addition, neither lay-
men nor lawmakers understood the mathematics required to calcu-
late probabilities. The debate over prohibiting not only banking
games, where the house takes on all players, but percentage games,
where the house participates as a player but has a percentage ad-
vantage, shows that there was a general perception that having a
built-in edge was considered the same as cheating. Poker and other
round games, where players play against each other with no partici-
pant having a continuous advantage, were normally allowed to con-
tinue. These games are still legal in California today.26
The establishment of permanent cities in the West brought the
desire for law and order. Westerners wanted to be viewed as respect-
able in the eyes of their established East Coast counterparts. 27 With
this desire for civilization often came statutory prohibitions on
casinos.
Betting on horse races was not viewed as a problem, consider-
ing that bettors had to be physically present at the track. The in-
vention of the telegraph, telephone, and totalizer machines in the
late 19th century, however, made it possible for the average work-
ing man to bet on races taking place in another part of the country.
The establishment of "pool rooms" that took these bets led to the
passage of anti-bookie statutes prohibiting the transmission of gam-
bling information.
The 19th century ended with a second round of lottery scan-
dals. The Louisiana Lottery was the greatest, both in the size of its
operation and in the magnitude of the scandal. The lottery opera-
tors were accused, correctly, of attempting to buy the Louisiana
state legislature. Operators promoted their legal lottery tickets
throughout the nation. Technological advances had allowed the
25. See generally Virgil W. Peterson, Obstacles to Enforcement of Gambling Law, 269
ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAn. OF POLITICAL AND Soc. Sci.: GAMBLING 9 (1950) (describ-
ing difficulty of outlawing gambling in unsettled frontier areas); see also Virgil W.
Peterson, Gambling - Should It Be Legalized? 40J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259, 290
(Sept. 1949) (exploring ability of government to regulate gambling in Wild West).
26. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19(f) (noting authority to create and regulate
card rooms in California).
27. SeeJohn M. Findlay, PEOPLE OF CHANCE: GAMBLING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
FROM JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS Ch.3 (Oxford University Press 1986) (exploring
Western reformation in favor of Eastern methodologies).
2010]
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Louisiana Lottery to operate without being in close geographic
proximity to its customers.
Some states, like New York, reacted to the opening of Louisi-
ana Lottery stores in their major cities by enacting statutes which
made it a crime to sell a lottery ticket within their borders, even if
the lottery was legal where the drawing was being held. These stat-
utes still exist today, although they are of questionable constitution-
ality, since they interfere with interstate commerce.28 Furthermore,
the laws had little effect. The states were no more able to stop the
selling of Louisiana Lottery tickets in the 1880s and 1890s than they
were in the 1950s and 1960s with the Irish Sweepstakes. It became
clear that the states could not control this state-licensed lottery, ei-
ther because they did not wish to do so, or because ofjurisdictional
limits on their power to regulate legal activities originating in other
states.
Because the states were helpless, President Benjamin Harrison
asked Congress to pass legislation to close down the Louisiana Lot-
tery. Congress responded by using the various constitutional provi-
sions and federal powers it thought it had at the time to address
President Harrison's concerns. Congress first used its power to reg-
ulate the U.S. mails, which was the federal government's most pow-
erful weapon at the time.29 In 1890, Congress passed a law barring
the distribution of lottery material via the mails. At that time, 45%
of the entire New Orleans post office business concerned the Lot-
tery. The law, codified as section 1302 of title 18 of the United
States Code, specifically prohibits the use of the mails for lottery
tickets, for checks for the purchase of tickets, and even for "any
newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind contain-
ing any advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of
any kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or
chance." 0 In 1893, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
28. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 225.40 (McKinney 2008) (stating that "Any offense
defined in this article which consists of the commission of acts relating to a lottery
is no less criminal because the lottery itself is drawn or conducted without the state
and is not violative of the laws of the jurisdiction in which it was so drawn or
conducted.").
29. See 18 U.S.C. §1302 (2010) (outlining Congress' power over U.S. mails).
30. Id. The main mail fraud statute gives the Postal Service the authority to
intercept and return lottery mail. See 39 U.S.C. §3005(a) (1) (2006) (criminalizing
false representations in the mail concerning lotteries). Publications containing ad-
vertisements for foreign legal lotteries and envelopes containing lottery tickets are
often intercepted and returned or destroyed. See 1. Nelson Rose, The Impact of
American Laws on Foreign Legal Gambling, 8 N.Y.L SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 129, 132
(1986) (remarking on actions by Post Office officials).
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Act's use against a foreign legal lottery.3 1 The Court held that an
advertisement for certain bonds, issued by the government of Aus-
tria, could not be sent through the U.S. mails because they were
considered a form of lottery. The prohibitions of the act have been
expanded as technology has developed. Its prohibitions now reach
radio, television and the use of agents. 3 2
The rise of Victorian morality, scandals, and the desire for re-
spectability brought the second wave crashing down in the West.
The territories of New Mexico and Arizona were told that to gain
statehood they would have to close their casinos. 33 In 1909, even
the Nevada legislature outlawed casinos.34 By 1910 only Maryland,
Kentucky and New York were left, and in that year New York closed
its racetracks. The United States was once again virtually free of
legalized gambling.35
The most important legal debris of the crash of the second
wave were the federal anti-lottery laws passed in response to the
Louisiana Lottery scandal and other problems in the late 19th cen-
tury associated with legal lotteries licensed by various states. The
federal anti-lottery laws were so successful that all lotteries were de-
stroyed and no legal lottery existed in the United States for almost
70 years. These laws also helped create the modern United States.
The 1892 Louisiana Legislature passed a bill prohibiting ticket
sales after December 31, 1893.36 In October 1893, the organizers of
the Lottery announced that after January 1, 1894 the business
would operate out of Honduras. However, they used a loophole in
Florida's anti-lottery law to distribute the tickets out of Port Tampa,
while holding the drawings in Honduras or at sea. Having relo-
cated, the Lottery switched to using private express carriers, to con-
31. See generally Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 466-67 (1893) (apply-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 1302 to foreign lotteries).
32. See 18 U.S.C. §1301 (2010) (tracing development of law).
33. See B.W. Currie, The Transformation of the Southwest: Through the Legal Aboli-
tion of Gambling, CENTURY MAGAZINE, April 1908, at 905 (addressing transformation
of western united states gambling regulations). Nevada made casino gambling le-
gal on March 4, 1869. See Id.
34. See id. (noting that March 24 Act prohibits gambling and provides for "the
destruction of gambling property and other matters relating thereto"); see also
West Indies v. First Nat. Bank of Nevada, 67 Nev. 13, 23 (1950) (discussing Ne-
vada's changing public policy towards gambling during early nineteenth century).
35. See David Weinstein and Lillan Deitch, THE IMPACT OF LEGALIZED GAM-
BLING: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOTTERIES AND OFF-TRACK BETTING
13-14 (Praeger Publishers Inc 1974) (detailing US's near freedom from gambling
during turn of nineteenth century).
36. See Rose, supra note 30, at 133 (noting that Louisiana passed ban on lot-
tery ticket sales that failed to completely stop Louisiana Lottery).
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tinue operation without violating U.S. postal laws. Congress was
thus forced to push its constitutional power to the limit to prevent
the Lottery from reappearing. 37
Congress specifically turned to the Interstate Commerce
Clause to counter these new practices of the Louisiana Lottery. At
that time, the prevailing thought of the law was that "interstate com-
merce" was limited to commerce that was inter-state, for example,
shipping on rivers between states. The idea that Congress could
regulate legal commerce that happened to cross a state line was a
truly a radical idea for the time. Nevertheless, Congress passed the
bill and it was signed in 1895 with two minutes to spare. It was now
a federal crime to carry or send a lottery ticket, or lottery informa-
tion, or a list of lottery prizes in interstate or foreign commerce. 38
The Supreme Court, in The Lottery Case, upheld this great expansion
of the federal government's power in 1903.39
V. THE THIRD WAVE: THE DEPRESSION TO THE PRESENT
The Great Depression gave birth to the third wave of legal
gambling. Nevada re-legalized casino gambling in 1931.40 Twenty-
one states opened racetracks with pari-mutuel betting in the 1930s,
with additional states allowing pari-mutuel betting in every decade
since.41 Charities played Bingo, at first illegally, until many of the
states changed their laws in the 1940s and 1950s to permit charita-
ble and social gambling. New Hampshire re-discovered the state
lottery in 1964.
For the last sixty years, the fight has been over everything from
bingo, lotteries and horse and dog racing to poker, Internet gam-
ing and casinos. The big money prize today, however, would be to
legalize gaming machines, which has been difficult to this point.
37. See THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING, supra note 18, at 520
(exploring Congress' efforts to discourage reappearance of gambling).
38. See 18 U.S.C. §1301 (2010) (making it federal crime to send lottery ticket
via interstate commerce).
39. This is the common name given to Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903), and its companion case, Francis v. United States, 188 U.S. 375 (1903). See
Rose, supra note 30, at 133 (describing Lottery Cases).
40. See generally Nevada Act of March 4, 1869, 71, Nev. Laws 119 (making ca-
sino gambling legal); Act of March 24, 1909, c. 210, Nev. Laws 307 (outlawing
casinos for short period of time); Act of March 19, 1931, c.99, Nev. Laws 165 (rees-
tablishing casino gambling as legal).
41. SeeJOHN DOMBRINK & WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, THE LAST RESORT: SuccEss
AND FAILURE IN CAMPAIGNS FOR CASINOS 11 (1990) [hereinafter Dombrink &
Thompson] (noting rapidly increasing number of racetracks in state); see also Jo-
SEPH F. McDONALD, Gambling in Nevada, in Annals of the American Academy of Politi-
cal and Social Science: Gambling 30 (1950).
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Part of the problem comes from sloppy legal work done decades
ago. Operators of roulette wheels and conventional slot machines
were sometimes convicted of running illegal "lotteries." In some
jurisdictions the states' highest courts ruled that the word "lottery"
was synonymous with "gambling."
Today, state attorneys general find themselves making exactly
the opposite argument.42 Federally-recognized Indian tribes are al-
lowed to operate any form of gambling permitted by state law.43 A
federal judge in Wisconsin ruled that "lottery" means any game of
prize, chance and consideration. 44 The state operates a lottery;
therefore, the state had to negotiate to allow Indian tribes to have
any games of prize, chance and consideration, including blackjack
and video poker machines. 45
VI. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PROHIBITION IS REPEALED?
It is widely believed in this Third Wave of Legal Gambling that
anyone, including governments, can get rich quick. All one needs
to do to grab a piece of the action is to own, operate or tax some
form of legal gambling. An endless flow of instant, unlimited
wealth will follow. This delusion is a typical symptom of a classic
speculative bubble.
All bubbles grow out of unrealistic expectations, like the ones
preceding the Great Crash of 1929, the South Sea Bubble and
Dutch Tulipmania. 46 Fortunes can be made during such wild spec-
ulation. The word millionaire came into use for the first time during
France's Mississippi Company bubble of 1716-1720. 47 And the
dream of instant, unending riches is not limited to Americans. Ca-
42. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987) (exhibiting evidence as to how lotteries are different from other forms of
gambling).
43. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 102 Stat. 2467, 100-497 (Oct.
17, 1988) (legalizing all forms of gambling for Indians as are legal for others).
44. See Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wiscon-
sin, 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wisc. 1991), appeal dismissed 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.
1992) (dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction).
45. See id. (noting balancing of state interests with private casino owners
interest).
46. SeeJOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1961) (explaining
how stock market crash affects gambling) [hereinafter Galbraith]; see alsoJ. BuL-
GATZ, PONZI SCHEMES, INVADERS FROM MARS & MORE ExTRAoRDINARY POPULAR
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 101 (1992) [hereinafter Bulgatz] (not-
ing how events like stock market crash cause mass hysteria).
47. See DAVID DREMAN, CoNTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGY: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF STOCK MARKET SUCCESS 63 (1979) (analyzing stock market tendencies and re-
sponses to changes in market).
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nada, Australia, and Europe have been hit by the legal gambling
bug just as badly, or worse. Interestingly, "With the opening of On-
tario's Casino Niagara, Canada's gaming industry employs more
than 46,000 people - 12 times the size of the nation's commercial
fishing industry. ' 48 And nothing compares to the percentage
growth of lotteries, casinos, and pari-mutuel betting in the newly
freed former Soviet bloc and the truly fantastic developments in
Macau and Singapore.
Unlike tulip bulbs, commodities or stock index futures, legal
gambling can, in fact, generate revenue. 49 That revenue, however,
will not be on the scale imagined nor can it expand endlessly in the
face of direct competition. Not every town can become the next
Las Vegas. There is a big difference between being the only legal
casino on the East Coast and owning a riverboat in Iowa when there
is a competing riverboat only ten minutes away in Illinois with un-
limited stakes.
Suppose Prohibition of alcohol had just been repealed. The
hypothetical owner of the first and only liquor store in a state would
make a fantastic return on investment. But soon, if there were no
government controls, there would be liquor stores throughout the
state, as few barriers to entry would exist. Excess profits would soon
disappear and returns on investment would descend back to nor-
mal levels.
Government regulation makes the situation worse. The fantasy
that there is an infinitely elastic demand for gambling seems to hit
politicians harder than entrepreneurs. From a representative's per-
spective, sin taxes are always viewed as an easy revenue source. Casi-
nos, like liquor stores and tobacco retailers, are easier targets than
more politically acceptable businesses. Government thinking is
that people should not be gambling and those that do, will con-
tinue to make wagers, regardless of the additional cost. Thus, even
though a quarter of the gaming establishments in a jurisdiction
might go bankrupt, the state continues to consider raising taxes on
gaming.
Resorts International opened the first legal casino on the East
Coast on May 26, 1978, spending $45.2 million to refurbish the old
Chalfonte-Haddon hotel in Atlantic City. 50 Its first year gross reve-
48. National Gaming Summary, CASINO J., Dec. 23, 1996 at 10.
49. See Galbraith, supra note 46 at 1929 (explaining reference to tulip bulbs as
evidence of speculative behavior).
50. See M. Satchell, Atlantic City's Great Gold Rush, PARADE, June 10, 1979, at 8
(describing refurbishment of old Chalfonte-Haddon hotel).
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nue of $224.6 million made it the most profitable casino in the
world.51 The state of New Jersey collected $18 million in taxes that
first year.52 Twelve more casinos quickly followed. The Trump Taj
Mahal, the thirteenth Atlantic City casino to open, cost over $1.1
billion in 1990. 5 3 The Taj opened in April 1990; it declared bank-
ruptcy in July 1991. Of the thirteen casinos that had opened in
Atlantic City, eight have been involved in formal bankruptcy
proceedings. 54
The explosion of legal gambling has finally settled the question
of whether availability creates demand. The metropolitan area of
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, near the Mississippi casinos, has a popu-
lation of 112,993.55 Consequently, this area ranks eighth in the na-
tion as the most important feeder market for casino gaming, far
above such massive cities as Houston and Seattle, which did not
even make the top ten.5 6 Although availability creates demand,
that demand is not endless. Even a casino in New Orleans will fail if
Louisiana and Mississippi are already saturated with competing
forms of gambling.
In February 1992, the small Mashantucket Pequot tribe opened
the Foxwoods High Stakes Bingo & Casino in Connecticut.57 In
January 1993, the tribe began operating the only legal slot ma-
chines between Atlantic City and Canada. The initial 260 machines
produced slightly over $2 million that first month. By July 1993,
51. See N.J. Casino Control Comm'n, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1979) (noting Resort
International's first year gross revenue of $224.6 million); see also David Janson,
Resorts Wins a Permanent License to Operate a Casino in Atlantic City, N.Y. TIMES at Al,
B5 (Feb. 27, 1979) (noting success of some casinos in gaining licenses).
52. SeeJanson, supra note 51. In their first 15 years in operation, the casinos of
Atlantic City, which never numbered more than thirteen, claim they paid a total of
six billion dollars in local, state and federal taxes. See id.
53. See A. Sloan, And Now, Trump's Taj Mahal: The Soap Opera, L.A. TIMES Nov.
12, 1990 at D5 (noting Taj Mahal's difficulty in obtaining gambling license).
54. See Atlantic City's Sands Declares Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, CASINO J., Feb. 1998
at 30 (detailing Sands' declaration of Bankruptcy); see also Playboy Tangles With Ca-
sino in Chapter 11, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1985, at IV 1 (discussing issues with bank-
rupt casinos); see also Hancock Institutional Equity Services, Industry Review, United
States Casino Gaming Industry Update: Hedge Your Bets, June 19, 1992, at 4 (consider-
ing investment and casino bankruptcy); see also Resorts International Files for Bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at DI (detailing Resorts' Chapter
11 filing); International-Bankruptcy, AP NEwswnRE, Mar. 21, 1994, at 2013 (describ-
ing unprofitability of Resorts casino).
55. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcTs 381, 403 (Mahwah, New Jersey:
Funk & Wagnalls 1995) (relating population of metropolitan area of Biloxi-Guff-
port-Pascagoula).
56. See Casino J., Top Ten Casino Feeder Markets, NAT'L GAMINC SUMMARY, Apr.
3, 1995 (quoting Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment (1995)).
57. The tribe grew from 150 to more than 250 members after getting the
right to open a casino.
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Foxwoods had 1,471 operating machines, earning $26.2 million for
the month, for an average profit of $575 per machine per day. The
slot machines at Foxwoods were earning twice as much per device
as the slot machines in Atlantic City.58 Further, they were earning
four times the $140 per day won by $1 slot machines on the Las
Vegas strip. 59 By October 1993 the numbers had doubled again.
The tribe now had 3,137 slot machines generating $1.625 million
per day.60
Foxwoods demonstrates the power of a monopoly (now an oli-
gopoly), as well as the dangers. 61 Foxwoods reported that $660 mil-
lion was wagered (the "slot handle") at its 4,585 slot machines
during November 1996, resulting in a "slot win" of $38 million for
the month. 62 Although the number of machines is comparable, the
Trump Plaza's slots attracted less than half the amount wagered at
Foxwoods; the slot handle was $272 million, producing a slot win of
$22 million. 63 By 1997, no one disputed that Foxwoods was the
most profitable casino in the world. The tribe is only required to
report the amounts wagered on slot machines and bingo, but the
numbers support the conclusion that Foxwoods is the first casino in
history to win over $1 billion from its patrons. The state of Con-
necticut failed to include any restrictions in its compact with the
tribe, so Foxwoods keeps growing, swallowing up nearby forested
land for parking lots, hotels, and more casino games. As of 2010,
Foxwoods has three hotels with 1,916 rooms, 344,000 square feet of
casino gaming space including 7,200 gaming machines and 380 ta-
ble and poker games. 64 Placing these numbers into some context,
Foxwoods is currently double the size of the largest Las Vegas
casino.
58. See Atlantic City Slots Win a Daily Average of $275. Slots Yield Bonanza for
Foxwoods Casino, RENo-GAzEYTE J., Aug. 7, 1993, at 8B (describing profitability of
Atlantic City slot machines).
59. See id (comparing Atlantic City slot machines to Las Vegas slot machines).
60. See J. Diamond, Indian Casino's Take far Exceeds Industry Norm, RENo-GA-
ZET-rEJ., Oct. 11, 1993, at 2 (highlighting peak of Foxwoods' success).
61. See Casino Revenue November 1996, 10 CASINOJ., Mar. 1997, at 21 (consider-
ing dangers of casino monopolies). On October 12, 1996 a second federally recog-
nized tribe in Connecticut opened a casino. See id (describing new entrant in
Connecticut casino market). The count in November 1996 was 4,585 slots in
Foxwoods and 2,548 in the Mohegan Sun. See id. (detailing competition between
Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun).
62. See id. (reporting Foxwoods' slot win for November 1996).
63. See id. (comparing Foxwoods with Trump Plaza).
64. See Foxwoods Casino Reports, http://foxwoods.casinocity.com/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2010) (stating facts and figures of Foxwoods' casino in Connecticut).
[Vol. 17: p. 361
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/5
THE THIRD WAVE OF LEGAL GAMBLING
Political and economic pressure to break Foxwoods' monopoly
in the Northeast U.S. market has made competition inevitable.
Even before the Mohegan Sun opened the second casino in Con-
necticut, another tribe, the Oneidas, opened Turning Stone in
1993 in the middle of New York. Casino ships with slots started
operating out of ports in Connecticut. Tribes in Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, and Maine fought in court and sought political allies
in their battles to open casinos. Legislation for slot machines,
Video Lottery Terminals, and more casinos on riverboats and on
land were introduced in state legislatures in New York, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and every other ju-
risdiction north of Atlantic City.
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation expected its casino
gaming to grow indefinitely. This expectation was also strangely
held by its banks and other sophisticated lenders. Today, Foxwoods
is in default on billions of dollars in loans.65
VII. ELECTIONS SHow A TIDAL CHANGE IN ArTITUDES TowARD
LEGAL GAMBLING
Until the November 1996 elections, all high-stakes, casino-style
gambling in America, with the exception of Atlantic City, had been
created without the approval of the electorate of a state. High-stake
casinos were authorized by state legislatures acting on their own -
even Nevada voters were never asked whether they wanted casinos
- as well as Indian Tribes.66 Prior to 1996, high-stakes casinos had
won only one statewide election: 1976 in New Jersey. 67 And that
was not really a contest. The opposition was so over-confident, hav-
ing defeated casinos at the polls by 60% only two years earlier, that
they literally ran no campaign against the Atlantic City proposal.
Committees opposing casinos took in only $23,230 and did not
even spend it all, while proponents spent $1,330,615. Thus, it was
possible to say that no state had ever voted to amend its state consti-
tution to allow high-stake casinos in the face of active opposition.
65. See Gale Courey Toensing, Mashantucket and Lenders Extend Debt Forbearance
Agreement, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.
com/home/content/82383472.html (last visitedJan. 25, 2010) (reporting on debt
agreement in Mashantucket that led to huge debt).
66. Other political players have been involved. In the case of Indian casinos,
for example, tribal governments, state governors, federal agencies and Congress
have given their approval, often because of adverse court rulings.
67. See Dombrink & Thompson, supra note 41, at 37 (explaining NewJersey's
election to be one of few gambling wins of time period).
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There had been a few successful elections at the local level,
with cities and counties approving high-stakes casinos; however, the
only way to win a casino election statewide had been to promise the
voters that gaming would be isolated onto a mountaintop or sur-
rounded by water with low stakes. Colorado and South Dakota vot-
ers approved five-dollar maximum blackjack and slot machines,
while Missouri voters accepted riverboats with $500 loss limits. Yet
even these casino's electoral victories all occurred in the prior
decade.
Every attempt to raise the stakes had also been soundly re-
jected by voters. In South Dakota, for example, to justify building a
massive casino-resort, Dan and Kevin Costner attempted to have bet
limits raised from five to one-hundred dollars and to allow more
slot machines per casino. Low-stakes casinos were already operat-
ing in Deadwood and on Indian land, while the state was operating
thousands of Video Lottery Terminals. The Costner's spent at least
ten times as much as their opponents. Yet, in September 1993 only
42% of South Dakota's voters voted in favor of bringing in high-
stakes casinos.
Part of the reason for such electoral defeats in the past can be
viewed as a result of Americans' attitudes toward legal gambling. It
is still the overwhelming rule that most people do not take gam-
bling seriously, unless they are asked to approve it in their own
backyards. Then, it will be allowed only if it is viewed as one of the
"safe kinds," such as bingo or a state lottery. If it can be isolated to
a mountain town, or somehow sanitized by surrounding it with 30
feet of river water, it is somehow also viewed as acceptable. But, if
the general population is asked to vote for casino gambling or slot
machines where their children might be tempted to play them,
then it is no longer acceptable.
November 1996 marked a turning point and the greatest vic-
tory in American history for legal gambling. Unprecedented break-
throughs in gambling laws occurred in virtually every area of the
country. For the first time in American history, the citizens of a
state (actually two states: Michigan and Arizona) voted, in the face
of active opposition, to bring in new, high-stakes casinos. Also for
the first time in American history, local citizens throughout a state
(Louisiana) voted unanimously, in the face of active opposition, to
retain high-stakes casinos.
News articles written immediately after the election called the
results mixed - contrasting these wins against an even greater
number of losses, including casino initiatives losing in Arkansas,
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Colorado, Guam and Ohio. What is not recognized is that twenty
years earlier casino gambling would have lost every election. The
vote to keep and establish new casinos indicates that there has been
a tidal wave of change in the way Americans feel about legal gam-
bling. Voters, for the first time ever, have accepted local gaming as
a normal part of their lives. Voters have in the past approved state
lotteries. They often vote in favor of horse racing. But, it deserves
repeating: In dozens of attempts over the last 200 years, never
before had the citizens of a state voted, in the face of active opposi-
tion, to bring in new, high-stakes casinos.
Despite their claims, organized anti-gambling activists have al-
most never been a significant factor.68 In 1990, professors William
N. Thompson, University of Nevada Las Vegas, and John Dom-
brink, University of California Irvine, published their study, The Last
Resort: Success and Failure in Campaigns for Casinos.69 Examining vir-
tually every election up to the date of publication, Thompson and
Dombrink found that statewide casino campaigns never succeeded,
as long as a single powerful political actor was opposed. Thompson
and Dombrink called this the veto factor. Until November 1996,
the veto factor had held true for all statewide votes for high-stakes
casinos. Thus, the campaigns to bring casinos to Ohio and Arkan-
sas in 1996 had as little chance of succeeding as the Florida cam-
paigns had in 1978 or 1994.
In 1996, something unprecedented occurred in Michigan and
Arizona. In these states, all political voices seemed to be unified in
opposition to casinos. The governors of both states actively cam-
paigned against the initiatives. Yet, statewide voters approved al-
lowing new casinos without limiting the size of wagers or restricting
the gaming onto riverboats or mountaintops.
Also, for the first time in American history, local citizens
throughout a state voted unanimously in the face of active opposi-
tion to retain their high-stakes casinos. Six parishes in Louisiana
have riverboat casinos and the Orleans Parish has a land-based ca-
sino. All seven voted, by enormous margins of up to 71%, to keep
68. Opponents of legal gambling have become more organized and do, occa-
sionally, make a difference in a close election. In November, 1999, anti-gambling
activists, led by churches and the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling,
won a surprising victory against a proposed state lottery in Alabama. Of course,
the massive casino industry in neighboring Mississippi and Alabama's own race-
tracks might also have played a role in blocking the creation of a new competitor.
69. Dombrink & Thompson, supra note 41, at 11.
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their casinos; statewide, voters approved riverboat casinos by 58% to
42 %.70
In November 1996, commercial gambling won scattered victo-
ries in every region of the country, even in the most conservative
states. Twenty-three additional parishes in Louisiana approved the
option of establishing new riverboat casinos. Jefferson County,
West Virginia approved up to 1,000 Video Lottery Terminals
("VLTs") at the Charles Town racetrack. Michigan rejected a ban
on bingo for political fund-raisers. Likewise, Marion County, Indi-
ana, voted in favor of building a harness racetrack outside
Indianapolis.
The remaining question is why voters accept legal gambling as
a regular part of their lives. One answer is the power of incremen-
tal change; the unthinkable becomes commonplace if taken in
small doses. In November, 1996, when Michigan voters approved
casinos for Detroit, the state already had eleven high-stakes Indian
casinos. Two of the most profitable casinos in the world were al-
ready open in Windsor, Ontario, across the river from Detroit. Ari-
zona's Governor Symington had already signed compacts with
sixteen tribes; in 1996, voters told him to let the five tribes that had
been left out also have casinos. West Virginia already allowed VLTs
at four other racetracks. Indiana already had other racetracks.
It can be argued that the unprecedented casino victories in
Michigan and Arizona were the result of special factors. But, every
election has special factors; the issue is whether there are unique
factors in Michigan and Arizona. This question can be answered in
the affirmative by noting that both states already had tribal casinos
within their borders and privately operated casinos next door.
Ohio, Arkansas, and Florida, on the other hand, had no tribal casi-
nos. Furthermore, every state either already has casino-style gam-
ing or is near another state with tribal, land-based or riverboat
casinos.
The tidal change in the public's attitude toward legal gambling
was confirmed two years later. Proponents of legalized gaming won
virtually every race in the November 1998 elections. Proposition 5
in California received the most attention. Proponents of Indian
casinos had enormous financial and political resources, but the size
of the landslide, sixty-three percent to thirty-seven percent, shows
70. See Gary L. Burhop, In '96, Gambling Gained New Voter Acceptance, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26, 1996, at A12 (noting change in acceptance of gambling and
change in attitude of public towards gambling venues due to revenues).
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California voters simply do not fear casinos or slot machines. 71 In
Missouri, voters approved "riverboat" (actually "boats in moats")
casinos for the third time. In New Jersey, voters approved off-track
phone betting; in 1980 they had voted down innocuous Sunday rac-
ing. In Arizona, a large majority voted to extend the state lottery,
despite repeated crises and religious opposition.
Gaming opponents rarely can gather enough signatures to get
repeal on the ballot. They failed in 1998 in both Michigan and
Mississippi, but the vocal opposition can sometimes force fearful
legislators to let the voters decide. But while the instances are few,
anti-gambling forces did have a few victories. A heated fight in Ma-
ryland ended with a win for incumbent Governor Parris Glenden-
ing, a vocal opponent of racetrack slot machines. Even here,
surveys showed that gambling was not an issue; voters were most
concerned about education. The only wins in 1998 were in Arizona
and Missouri where voters outlawed cockfighting.
The November 2000 elections reconfirmed the tidal change in
the way voters view legal gambling. In a self-congratulatory newslet-
ter to its followers, the Reverend Tom Grey, Executive Director of
the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, portrayed the
results of the November 7, 2000 races as follows: "By their votes at
the polls Americans proved that they are waking up to the threat
facing our country and have soundly rejected legalized gambling in
Arkansas, Maine, West Virginia, New Mexico and Wisconsin." 72 This
statement is not exactly correct. Arkansas certainly was an election
defeat, but the proposal was so bizarre that it was not a fair test of
the voters' feelings toward legal gambling. West Virginia's election
was even stranger. Only voters in rural Greenbrier County cast bal-
lots. There were only 7,065 "No" and 5,109 '"Yes" votes. The citi-
zens of Greenbrier County rejected the plan to put a casino, which
would be open only to registered guests of the Greenbrier Hotel, in
a converted bomb shelter.73
71. See Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int'l. Union v. Davis, 981
P.2d 990 (1999) (citing example of Indian gambling voters swaying election re-
sult). The state's tribes easily gathered enough signatures to put the issue back on
the ballot, this time as an amendment to the State Constitution. Id. (describing
voter turnout for state constitutional amendment). Voters approved Proposition
IA in March, 2000 by an overwhelming margin, giving tribes a monopoly on casi-
nos in California. Id. (noting approval of Proposition IA).
72. Letter dated November 2000 to "Dear Friend", NCALG NEWSLETrR, Nov.
2000, at vol. 8, No. 3.
73. See West Virginia Limited Gaming Facility Act, W. VA. CODE §§29-25-1
(1999) (describing Greenbrier county's gambling rejection).
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Elsewhere, legal gambling won big. In South Dakota, voters
approved keeping their video lottery terminals and raising the max-
imum betting limits in casinos in Deadwood from five to one hun-
dred dollars. South Carolinians voted to establish a state lottery.
Voters in Colorado approved joining multi-state lotteries, and those
in Massachusetts voted to keep their greyhound racing.
The best the Reverend Grey could say about these smashing
state-wide defeats of the anti-gambling movements was, "In those
states where gambling was defeated, it was by a much higher margin
than in those states where gambling initiatives passed." The mar-
gins of victory could be significant if they were part of a national
trend. But history has demonstrated that the trend is exactly the
opposite of what opponents want. Fifty years ago, every one of
these pro-gambling proposals would have been defeated at the
polls, and by margins of two or three-to-one. The fact that any of
them made the ballot, let alone won, shows that voters have come
to accept legal gambling as merely another part of everyday life.
One of the most interesting results of the Fall 2000 election
shows how political power has shifted in the last decade. Democrat
Maria Cantwell beat Washington State's most powerful politician,
incumbent Senator Slade Gorton, by less than one-tenth of one per-
cent, with the help of $1 million from gaming tribes.
Most proposals for legalization still do fail. For example, a
plan in 2010 for an Indian casino to be opened in Youngstown,
Ohio, has gone nowhere, in part, because there are no federally
recognized tribes in Ohio, and in part because the plan comes from
a former member of Congress who had been convicted of corrup-
tion.7 4 Still, the fact that even such a ridiculous proposal could get
any attention at all shows how widespread the dream of legalizing
gaming has spread.
The tsunami nature of the third wave of legal gambling has
been confirmed in actual, as well as potential, developments over
the past few years, including events which would have been consid-
ered impossible a decade or two earlier. Voters approved amend-
ing the state constitution to allow high-stakes casinos in Ohio's four
largest cities, while the governor got the state legislature to approve
74. See Ohio Casino Plan from Convicted Ex-Rep. Draws No Interest, THE ASSOCI-
ATED PREss: THE HERALD-DISPATCH, available at http://www.herald-dispatch.com/
news/briefs/x802129380/Ohio-casino-plan-from-convicted-ex-Rep-draws-no-in ter-
est (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (explaining lack of Ohio interest in casinos and
gambling benefits to state).
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gaming machines for the state's racetracks. 75 Kansas became the
first state to own true casinos, considered "lotteries" under Kansas
state law, which therefore could be operated by the State Lottery.
76
Delaware legalized and opened massive sports books, the only ones
east of the Mississippi, and then approved table games to add to its
"racinos." Maryland approved slot machines and is on the verge of
allowing table games. Tracks and other operators of certain gam-
ing devices opened magnificent casinos in Alabama, using ma-
chines that may or may not be legally bingo. The governor of
Pennsylvania worked hard to get table games approved, to join the
60,000 slot machines at that state's casinos. In a world on the brink
of an economic depression, where attention is naturally drawn to
casino bankruptcies and gaming tribes defaulting on multi-million
dollar loans, it is natural that almost no one noticed that in 2009
the legal, licensed slot machines in Pennsylvania made more money
then all the slot machines in Atlantic City.
VIII. REASONS FOR THE SPREAD OF LEGAL GAMBLING
A. The Morality Argument is Dead
It is no longer considered acceptable to oppose gambling on
the ground that it is immoral. This reflects a general trend
throughout the United States of the rise of situational ethics. But
gambling opponents lost their main moral spokesmen, once
churches started running bingo games and government began sell-
ing lottery tickets. Ninety years ago all gambling was illegal and it
was a crime to sell someone a drink. Today, governments are sell-
ing lottery tickets and taking bets on football games and there is
talk of legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, drugs. On November
5, 1996, voters in California and Arizona approved the use of mari-
juana for medical treatment.77 With no one to say what is right or
wrong, everything has become a cost/benefit analysis. Gambling
makes money, even accounting for social costs, particularly if it is
run as a monopoly.
75. See Alexandra Berzon, Casino Bid in Recession-Battered Ohio, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125711668815121609.
html (explaining need for Ohio to allow gambling in order to produce revenues).
76. See Casino's First Week Stirs Cautious Optimism, ASSOCIATE PRESS, Feb. 16,
2010, available at http://www.kansas.com/2010/02/16/1183145/casinos-first-
weeks-stir-cautious.html (describing hesitant acceptance of Kansas casino).
77. SeeJ. Balzar, Voters Approve Measure to Use Pot as Medicine, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
6, 1996, at Al (comparing acceptance of marijuana laws to protesting on gambling
law).
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B. Government Has Said it is Okay
A large segment of society believes that the government knows
best. With all the talk about forbidden fruit, it is important to re-
member that most people will not break the law, even if they will
not get caught; drivers stop at red lights at 3 a.m. in the open de-
sert. There are also millions of adults who believe government
knows best and will protect them; it is not a coincidence that
George Orwell called his 1984 dystopia dictator "Big Brother."
C. The Outrageous Becomes Acceptable if Taken in
Small Doses
As mentioned previously, there is tremendous power in incre-
mental change. The first state lottery of this century, the New
Hampshire Sweepstakes in 1964, cost $3, required players to fill out
a form and was held twice-a-year; it was a financial failure. But
drawings went from twice-a-year to weekly to daily to rub-off tickets.
We now have Video Lottery Terminals, where the lottery player can
put money into a machine and be paid on the spot. Thirty years
ago it would have been unthinkable that states would be operating
such slot machines.
D. The Domino Effect.
New Hampshire was the first with a state lottery this century,
but 80% of its players came from New York, Massachusetts and Con-
necticut. The second lottery was New York and the third, its neigh-
bor, New Jersey. When every state has lotteries, the first to
introduce off-track betting or casinos has an advantage, until that
spreads.
E. The Easy Money is Not so Easy; States are Hooked on
Gambling Revenues.
Lottery tickets are poor consumer items - people buy them
for a while and stop. States are forced constantly to come up with
more promotions and new games. States like Iowa that thought
they could sit back and make millions on $5 maximum casinos on
riverboats, only later to find that the state has to constantly support
the enterprises, particularly during the winter, and come to the res-
cue of failing operations. After half its casino riverboats sailed
south, the Iowa legislature raised the betting limits to match nearby
Illinois.
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F. Gambling Begets Gambling
Players always want games that are faster and easier, with at
least the illusion of player control. Many casinos are becoming
nothing more than video slot machine warehouses. Eventually, we
may well see video poker machines and lottery terminals in every
city.
G. Competition for the Gambling Dollar is Fierce.
Casinos in Nevada have had to introduce Megabucks and mil-
lion dollar Keno games to compete against California's lottery. The
racing industry has been particularly hard hit by the introduction of
lotteries and tribal casinos. The surviving tracks are asking state leg-
islatures to let them have slot machines and Internet betting to
avoid putting hundreds of people out of work.78
H. Operators Push to the Limits
If the law allows "pull-tabs," operators will construct devices
with a slot and video screen and call the machines "video pull-tabs."
Every time the rules are relaxed for one form of gambling political
opponents immediately demand "a level playing field."
IX. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON LEGAL GAMBLING
Although it is possible to see the general trends and cycles in
gambling, it is impossible to predict how exactly it will develop be-
cause the games are inherently dependent on technology. Daniel J.
Boorstin analyzed the differences between what he calls the new
"Machine Kingdom," and the traditional designations of the
"Animal, Vegetable and Mineral Kingdoms" in his book CLEOPA-
TRA'S NOSE. 79 The development of the Internet in general, and on-
line gaming in particular, illustrates how invention creates a
demand that did not formally exist because the technology itself
did not exist.
Inventions redefine experience. Modern technology has
played havoc with traditional legal categories. The NewJersey State
Lottery and casinos in Atlantic City battled over which would have
the right to run Keno games. The law can react to unexpected
technological developments. However, inventions cannot be un-in-
78. See 63 Bulletin of the Association of Racing Commissioners International, Inc., at
1 (No. 16, May 9, 1997) (asking for Internet betting).
79. See Daniel J. Boorstin, CLEOPATRA'S NOSE: ESSAYS ON THE UNEXPECTED, C.
14 (1994) (analyzing impact of technology on gambling).
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vented. If the demand has been created, technology will eventually
find ways of getting around the legal barriers.
Boorstin points out that the "most potent machines assimilate
all environments." Every form of gambling can now be played on a
computerized video screen. Inventions expand experience - tech-
nology creates its own demand. One of the most popular forms of
gambling in 2010 is on video poker machines: Did anyone want to
play video poker before it was invented? Video games and home
computers created the ability to play faster games more conve-
niently; the video poker machine created the need for games that
play like video poker machines. Inventions are increasingly intru-
sive and "the advance of technology in our times attests our increas-
ing inability to exclude novelties or their consequences from our
daily lives."
Whether this is a bad thing is difficult to judge because "our
nation has grown by its need for the unnecessary, another name for
human progress. Law constantly has to adjust to technological de-
velopments in gambling, designing new means of control. As Boor-
stin put it, "For us invention has become the mother of necessity."
Changes in the law always trail changes in society. As gambling
becomes more accepted, and technology makes the games more
interesting, intrusive and easily available prohibitions will continue
to fall. History tells us that this is the Golden Age of Legal Gam-
bling. But "golden ages" are always recognized only in retrospect,
after everything has once again been made illegal.
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